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For 200 years it has been public policy 
that farmers in the United States should 
control the land they operate as owners, 
not tenants -- by deed, not lease; by 
buying, not renting. For the first 100 
years, an abundance of public lands for 
sale at low prices or by homesteading made 
it relatively easy for farmers to acquire 
ownership. 
Ownership provides farmers with freedom 
to develop, improve, conserve or use land 
as directed only by the free marketplace. 
Hence these owner operators cleared the 
lands of forests, brush and stone. They 
broke the prairie, built homes, barns, 
fences and roads. They established 
schools, churches and local governments. 
At the same time their freedom to use the 
latest machinery on large and fertile 
fields produced crops �nd livestock with 
an efficiency never before known. 
This record suggests that past public 
policy was good policy -- that future 
farmers should control the land they 
operate as owners, not tenants. But full 
farm ownership has become increasingly 
difficult to achieve and maintain. Now 
two fifths of the nation's farmland is 
under lease. In the most productive areas 
of the country over 60% of the land is 
under lease -- much of it for some kind of 
a share rent. How does share rent affect 
farmers' freedom? 
Some studies have shown that share 
tenants use about the same farming 
practices as cash tenants and owner oper­
ators. Other studies show that share 
tenants have lost most of the freedom and 
incentive to develop, improve and conserve 
the land and buildings they lease. This 
situation raises these questions: 
(1) What are the freedoms provided by 
ownership? Why are they important? 
(2) What are the alternative ways these 
freedoms can be provided? 
(3) What are the problems of share rent 
leasing? 
(4) What are the problems and possibili­
ties of fixed or flexible cash rent 
leasing? 
(5) What research is suggested by this 
review of farm ownership and tenancy 
problems? 
The purpose of this circular is to 
answer these and related questions. Most 
evidence to support answers is drawn from 
many studies made during the past 30 
years. Some of the more important sources 
are listed at the end for readers who want 
further information. 
I. FREEDOM, MOTIVATION AND FARMING 
It is in the public interest that 
farmers be strongly motivated to wisely 
develop, improve, conserve and use the 
nation's farmland. What is necessary to 
motivate them to do a good job of 
farming -- a job that produces needed food 
for this generation but conserves the land 
for future generations? 
Philosophers and psychologists say 
people want freedom from their basic phys­
iological needs such as food, clothing and 
shelter -- now and in the future. When 
these needs are met they have freedom to 
achieve "the good life" -- however 
defined. Hence motivation comes from 
within -- from basic physiological and 
psychological wants and needs. Given 
freedom, people with few exceptions strive 
to satisfy these wants for themselves, 
their families and future generations. 
When a farmer owns the land he oper­
ates, his warranty deed guarantees that he 
and his heirs may have and hold the land 
forever. In contrast most leases are made 
for short terms. Ownership provides 
greater freedom from loss of the land. 
Therefore it provides greater freedom from 
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basic wants for food, clothing and shelter. 
The owner's farm is his castle. This 
security gives him the greatest freedom to 
develop, improve and conserve the land. 
He knows he or his heirs will receive the 
benefits of his improvements. Because he 
is secure, he has more freedom to innovate, 
to adopt new and better ways of farming. 
He has more freedom to respond to public 
needs as indicated by prices and costs in 
the marketplace. 
Early philosophers also recognized that 
freedom from basic wants was necessary if 
people were to have freedom or liberty to 
make social, political and economic 
choices. Philosopher John Locke (1632-
1704) held that private ownership of land 
was the best guarantee of liberty or free­
dom. The early English agriculturalist 
Arthur Young (1741-1820) held that "the 
magic of property turns sand into gold." 
Adam Smith (1732-1790) believed that farm 
owner operators had the greatest freedom 
to improve and operate as indicated by the 
"invisible hand" of the marketplace. 
Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) accepted 
Locke's views, and he spoke for most of 
his countrymen when he urged that farmers 
should own the land they operate. Such 
ownership was, in his view, the best 
guarantee of freedom and morality. These 
views are reflected in both the Declara­
tion of Independence and the Constitution. 
Yet it was the abundance of raw land 
and the scarcity of labor that made owner 
operation the only practical system for 
improving and developing the nation's 
land. Landlords found the cost of clear­
ing and breaking the land prohibitive and 
tenants almost impossible to secure and 
keep. Investors quickly learned that it 
was more profitable to buy land wholesale 
and sell it retail. Farmers could not be 
induced to rent unimproved land when they 
could buy and improve their own. Because 
owners received all the benefits of their 
labor they willingly did what tenants or 
hired men were unwilling to do. 
II. OWNER OPERATION: PAST TRENDS 
AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
The freedoms needed by farmers are 
provided by ownership. What is the future 
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of owner operation in the United States? 
What are the alternatives? In order to 
judge future prospects, past trends need 
to be reviewed. 
A. Private Ownership of Farmland 
In 1969 about 58% of the nation's 2.3 
billion acres of land was in private 
ownership (Fig 1). While the federal 
government owns 34% of the land, most of 
this is located in the 11 western states 
and Alaska. Public lands have been 
described as the "scraps and remnants" of 
the nation's efforts to dispose of all 
land suited for farming. However, these 
remnants contain valuable forests, miner­
als and grazing lands. 
INDIAN TRIBES AND INDIVIDUALS 
TOTAL AREA 2.3 Bil. ACRES 
* 94 PEIICEIIT IS Ill THE ELEVEII WESTEIIII-MOST STATES AIIO ALASKA. 
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Fig. 1 --
Land ownership in the 50 states, 1969 
While the government owns, it does not 
operate public lands. Operation is turned 
over to private persons or corporations. 
For example, private ranchers graze 273 
million acres of federal pasture lands, 
sometimes under a lease, but generally 
under a permit for which they pay a fee. 
Of the 2.3 billion acres of land in the 
United States, about 57% is used for crop 
and livestock production (Fig 2). This 
includes some federal and state grazing 
lands. Practically all this land is 
privately owned except for the public 
grazing lands. 
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Fig. 2 -- Land use in the 50 states, 1969 
B. Public Programs for Private 
Ownership 
It was no accident that most of the 
land suited for farming became privately 
owned. Congress has repeatedly enacted 
legislation designed to help farmers 
acquire farm ownership (Fig 3). In 1800 
Congress provided government credit for 
land purchases, but because of widespread 
abuse, these laws were repealed in 1820. 
After 1841, squatters on the public land 
were given the first opportunity to buy 
the land they occupied. Before the Civil 
War land was often granted to soldiers as 
a bounty or bonus for their services. In 
1862 the 160-acre Homestead Act was passed 
which made public land free to anyone who 
would agree to farm and improve it. 
Because of the 160-acre limitation, the 
first homestead act was unsuited to the 
Great Plains and the West. Hence, in 1909 
homesteading of 320 acres was allowed, and 
in 1916 this was increased to 640 acres. 
But even this was not enough for success­
ful livestock ranching in many areas of 
the West. 
While federal land sales were discon­
tinued after 1890, this did not inhibit 
the creation of ranches because ranchers 
had free use of much of the public grazing 
lands of the West until 1934. Since then 
they have been permitted to graze these 
public lands for a modest fee. 
In 1880, the first census revealed that 
25% of the farms were operated by tenants. 
By 1910, 37% of the farms were thus 
operated, This situation led to the 
creation of the present Federal Land Banks 
to help tenants become owners. Yet the 
banks were unable to stem the tide. By 
1930, 42% of all farms and 44% of all 
farmland was under lease. The depression 
and droughts led to many farm mortgage 
foreclosures and to the creation of the 
Farm Security Administration (now called 
Farmers Home Administration) mainly to 
help tenants become owners. 
Practically every farm price support 
program has been partially justified on 
the grounds that it will help family farm­
ers secure and keep some control over the 
land they operate. 
Unfortunately any government program 
which makes it easier to buy land tends 
to increase land prices because demand is 
increased much more than supply. Thus 
while homestead acts, government credit 
and price supports may help some farmers 
acquire land ownership, they also tend to 
inflate land prices. As a result these 
programs are of little help to the next 
generation of farmers. 
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But the land market is not the villain; 
it is often a corrective for mistaken 
policies. The land market often also 
serves the public interest better than 
some public programs. For example, the 
homestead acts did not prevent large 
landed estates, did not prevent large­
scale farming -- corporate or otherwise 
and did not prevent "speculation" in land. 
What did most to prevent large landed 
estates, corporate farming, and excessive 
profits was the free market in land -­
many sellers as well as buyers competing 
with one another. True, the land market 
was not perfect. Some "speculators" 
helped to give early realtors and the 
marketplace a bad name. But recent 
studies have shown that because of a free 
land market most early realtors provided 
a valuable service at a competitive cost. 
While homesteads and other government 
programs helped some farmers attain 
ownership, they failed to maintain it for 
the next generation of farmers. Primogen­
iture -- inheritance laws which pass land 
from father to eldest son -- were not 
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popular in America. Thomas Jefferson led 
the opposition. Equal inheritance by all 
the children became the rule. 
Equal inheritance can be avoided if the 
father makes a will. The father can also 
either give or sell the land to an heir 
before his death, but such arrangements 
are generally deemed unfair unless all 
children are treated equally. Usually the 
operating heir has to buy out the other 
heirs. 
Sometimes this is impossible. Fre­
quently the son needs to invest his inher­
itance in machinery and livestock rather 
than land. Thus far, no more acceptable 
way of keeping the farm in the family has 
been found; each generation of farmers 
must buy the land at its market price or 
remain tenants. 
C. Ownership vs. Tenancy: Present 
Status and Future Prospects 
The present ownership situation is 
somewhat confusing. Is the glass half 
full or half empty? 
The 1969 census shows that 87% of all 
U.S. farmers owned some land (Fig 4). 
More specifically, 62% were full owners, 
25% were part owners (part tenants), and 
only 13% were full tenants. 
FARMS LAND IN FARMS 
Fig. 4 -- Farms and land in farms, 
by tenure of operator, 1969 
However, these figures are not a good 
indication of how U. S. farmland is held. 
The difference is shown in Fig 4. In 1969 
full owners operated only 35% of all farm­
land, part owners operated 52%, and 
full tenants only 13%. The picture of how 
farms are held must be compared with the 
picture of how farmland is held. 
80 
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Both pictures change rapidly as farms 
become larger. As farms increase in size, 
the number of full owners decline and the 
number of part owners increase. This is 
shown in Fig 5. Note that full owners 
operated 62% of farms with 140- 179 acres, 
38% of farms with 260-499 acres, and only 
29% of farms with 500-999 acres. In 
contrast, part owners operated only 20% 
of farms with 140-179 acres and over 60% of 
the farms with 1,000 acres or more. 
Between 1945 and 1969, U. S. farms 
doubled in size from 195 acres to 390 
acres. This trend is expected to con­
tinue. In 1968 an Iowa study by Saupe 
showed that Iowa farmers, using modern 
technology, could farm 600 acres without 
difficulty. It also showed that eastern 
South Dakota farmers with more small 
grains and pasture could operate about 
1,000 acres, those in central South Dakota 
about 2,400 acres, and those in western 
South Dakota over 7, 000 acres. Fu+ther­
more, this could be done without increas­
ing the amount of hired labor. Farm sizes 
can be expected to increase in the years 
ahead, usually by leasing more land. 
Hence, the trend toward part ownership can 
be expected to increase. 
_.,., 
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Fig. 5 -- Tenure characteristics by size of farm, 48 states, 1969 
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Fig. 6 -- Tenure characteristics by economic class of farm, 48 states, 1969 
Another measure of farm size is gross 
sales. Acres and sales are closely 
related. It is not surprising that the 
number of full owners decline and part 
owners increase as gross receipts increase 
(Fig 6). Note that tenants are not 
greatly affected by size. Again, as farms 
become larger in the years ahead, owner­
ship can be expected to decline. 
The amount of farmland leased (rented) 
by tenants has been decreasing since the 
MIL. ACRES 
1,200 1------+----f-----+---+------+----+-----+ 
o�����������..:.:.,..;.a�t:.l<..&,i�;.;...;...,;.������ ....... :..:.:..u.:s:.u.��.......i 
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 
Fig. 7 -- Land in farms by tenure of operator, 1969 
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1930's. The trends since 1900 for all 
farmers are shown in Fig 7.  At the same 
time the amount of farmland operated by 
part owners has been increasing. 
How much do part owners lease? In 1954 
part owners and tenants leased about the 
same amount of land, but by 1969 part 
owners leased twice as much land as ten­
ants. Together they leased 386 million 
acres in 1954. This increased to 404 
million acres in 1969. 
The total land leased between 1930 and 
1969 by both part owners and tenants is 
shown in Table 1. Note that between 1954 
and 1969 the amount of land leased in­
creased from 33 to 38%. If this trend 
continues at the same rate, over 50% of 
the land will be under lease by the year 
2000. 
The amount of land under lease has 
always been high in the most productive 
areas of the country. For example, in 
1959 over 60% of the land in the heart of 
the Corn Belt was under lease (Fig 8). 
This includes northwestern Iowa and part 
of southeastern South Dakota. In two 
thirds of South Dakota's counties 40 to 
60% of the land was under lease. While 
farm tenancy has declined since 1959, 
both part ownership and the amount of 
land under lease have increased. 
Full owners have declined in past years 
because of high land prices relative to 
farm incomes. Many farmers cannot afford 
to buy land because of the low return to 
land compared to machinery and livestock. 
Land prices are high because the demand 
for it is strong and the supply suitable 
for farming is practically fixed. Demand 
is strong because many farmers need more 
land and land is a good hedge against 
inflation. 
As a result land prices have reached an 
all-time high despite lagging farm incomes 
(Fig 9). Between 1960 and 1976 land 
prices increased 259%, or an average of 
16% a year. Investors find these increas-
Table 1. -- U. S. trends in farmland controlled by lease (rented), 1930-69 
U. S. land in farms-acres Percentage of land rented 
Year Total Rented Part owners Tenants Total 
Millions Millions % % % 
1930 990 432 13 31 44 
1935 1055 47 1 13 32 45 
1940 1065 469 15 29 44 
1945 1142 431 16 22 38 
1950 1161 386 15 18 33 
1954 1160 386 17  16 33 
1959 1123 382 20 14 34 
1964 1110 394 22 13 36 
1969 1063 404 25 13 38 
Source: 1930- 1964 data from U. S. Census of Agriculture as reported by 
Moyer and others, Land Tenure in the United States, USDA, ERS 
Agr. Info. Bul. 338, 1969 Table A-6. 1969 data is from 1969 
Census of Agriculture, Vol. II General Report Chapter 3. 
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es attractive but the higher prices make 
it impossible for most farmers to buy all 
the land they operate. Some farmers who 
have recently bought land are finding it 
difficult to meet the high interest and 
principal payments. Farmers with limited 
funds must use them to purchase machinery 
and livestock. As a result the amount of 
farmland under lease can be expected to 
continue to increase. 
The total value of U.S. farmland and 
buildings was $207 billion in 1970. Of 
this amount landlords furnished $69 
billion or 34%, while farm mortgages 
provided only $23 billion or 11%. Thus 
landlords are a very important source of 
capital for the farmer. 
What is needed are leases that give 
farmers more of the freedom of ownership. 
This is particularly true since about 40% 
of all farmland is under lease, and 
if present trends continue, over 50% will 
be under lease in the near future. 
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III. FREEDOM AND SHARE RENT LEASES 
In the past the freedom that farmers 
needed to develop, improve, conserve and 
use the land was provided by ownership. 
But in the future it appears that this 
freedom will have to be provided by some 
other means. Can it be provided by share 
rent leases? 
A. Cash vs. Share-Rent Leases 
Generally speaking there are two kinds 
of rents: share rents and cash rents. 
Included under share rents are share-cash 
and livestock-share leases. Thus defined, 
share rents have long been the most connnon 
way of leasing farms in most of the crop 
producing areas of the country (Fig 10) . 
Cash-rent farms have been most frequent 
in the Northeast and in parts of the South 
where truck crops are important, and in 
the Southwest and West where grazing is 
important. Cash rents are frequently used 
on part-time and residential farms. 
% OF 1960 I 
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Fig. 9 -- Farm land prices and net farm income 
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Cash-rent leases have been increasing. 
Between 1959 and 1969 cash-rent tenants 
increased from 14 to 19% of all leased 
farms and from 2 1  to 35% of the land in 
these farms. The figures for 1969 are 
presented in Table 2. In 1969, 55% of all 
tenants paid some kind of share rent 
(cash, crop, or livestock). Another 26% 
of all tenants paid "other or unspecified" 
rents for their farms on 18% of the land. 
Part owners made more use of cash rents. 
One third of part owners cash rented 50% 
of all the land they leased. But about 
half of the part owners used some kind of 
share rent on 34% of all land that they 
leased (Table 2). 
What are the "other and unspecified" 
rents? One kind is a fixed produce rent. 
But instead of delivering the produce, the 
farmer may pay the cash value of the 
produce. Either way, such a rent is 
closer to a cash rent than a share rent. 
When paid in cash it is one kind of flex­
ible cash rent -- a cash rent that varies 
with the price of a crop. Flexible cash 
rents may vary not only with crop price 
but county average yields of one or more 
crops. If neither the landlord nor the 
tenant can affect the amount of rent to be 
paid after the lease is signed, then 
flexible cash rents have the main advan­
tages of both share rents and fixed cash 
rents. 
B. Why Are Share Rents So 
Frequently Used? 
In England cash rents are almost uni­
versal. Why, then, are share rents so 
widely used in the United States? The 
main reason is that most English landlords 
are professional landlords who are inter­
ested in security of rents at least cost. 
Cash rent provides both. In contrast, 
many farm landlords in this country are 
retired farmers (or widows), or business 
and professional people with relatively 
short-range avocational or investment 
interests. They prefer share rents for 
several reasons: 
(1) Share rents introduce an element of 
partnership into the lease. This 
gives the share landlord a valid reason 
for participating in the farm business. 
This participation is especially impor­
tant for retired farmers and other 
Table 2. -- Kinds of rents paid by tenants and part,owners by farms and 
by land leased, U.S. , 1969 
12 
Number 
thousand 
271 
Kind of rent Percent 
Cash 19 
Share - cash 14 
Crop share 31 
Livestock share 10 
Other & unspecified 26 
TOTAL 100 
Tenants 
Acres leased 
million 
197 
Percent 
35 
15 
22 
9 
18 
100 
Number 
thousand 
581 
Percent 
34 
13 
32 
3 
18 
100 
Part owners 
Acres leased 
million 
207 
Percent 
50 
13 
19 
2 
16 
100 
Source: U. S. Census of Agriculture 1969, Col. II, Chapter 3, p. 19. 
landlords with farm experience. It 
also may be very helpful to young and 
inexperienced tenants. Cash landlords 
on the other hand, have little reason 
to participate. Furthermore, tenancy 
laws discourage such participation. 
(2) Share rents generally give landlords 
considerably higher returns on their 
investment than do cash rents. This 
is justified because the share land­
lord shares the tenant's management, 
weather, and price risks. When rents 
are the major source of income, as it 
is for many landlords, the higher 
share rents are often important. They 
are also important to business and 
professional people who have other 
profitable ways to use their money. 
(3) Share rents adjust automatically with 
crop yields and prices. Fixed cash 
rents do not. This automatic feature 
induced many landlords to shift from 
cash to share rents after World War II 
when crop yields were increasing 
rapidly. It also provides a strong 
incentive to continue with share rents 
during the present inflationary period. 
(4) Usually the share of crops to be paid 
as rent is uniform over very large 
areas. Because the productivity of 
farms varies, value of the share rent 
also varies. The variation in 
productivity makes it difficult to 
determine a fair cash rent and hence 
discourages,its use. However, uni­
form shares do not eliminate questions 
about the tenant's farming and his 
division of the crops. While the 
share is easily set, the amount of 
the share may become a major problem 
for both landlords and tenants. To 
protect themselves from poor manage­
ment and unfair division of crops, 
most share landlords make short-term 
leases -- usually one-year or year-to­
year. 
C. Freedom, Share Rents 
and Short Terms 
Landlords and tenants agree that the 
main reason short-term leases are used is 
to make sure that tenants do a good job 
and pay a fair share of the crops as rent. 
As long as share rents are used, short 
terms are fully justified. The share rent 
introduces an element of partnership into 
the lease, and as "partners" landlords are 
entitled to a voice in management and 
division of the crops. Thus share-rent 
landlords do not have as much "freedom 
from" worry about their tenants' manage­
ment as do cash and some flexible cash 
landlords. 
From this it follows that share tenants 
lack freedom to operate, conserve, and 
improve the land. Their first task, if 
they hope to keep the farm, is to operate 
it in a manner acceptable to their land­
lords -- a manner that provides "fair" 
rents. Because the burden of proof of 
good farming is on the tenants, they are 
insecure. Hence they can scarcely be 
expected to spend their time and money 
developing, improving, or conserving land 
or buildings. 
Some share landlords are reluctant to 
furnish improvements because there is 
often no direct payment for them. Even 
when specific cash rents are paid for 
them, these rents are often insufficient 
to pay taxes, insurance, interest and 
repairs. When landlords receive only a 
share of the crops and none of the share 
rent is earmarked for buildings, fences, 
and other improvements, landlords have 
little incentive to maintain or improve 
them. However, their tenants may argue 
that the share rents are large enough to 
cover both land and building costs. Often 
this results in disagreements that are 
difficult to resolve and cause insecurity. 
Some tenants may offer to make improve­
ments if their landlords will compensate 
them for their unexhausted value when they 
leave the farm. Landlords may be reluct­
ant to do this for some related reasons: 
(1) tenants may move after 1 or 2 years, 
thereby requiring their landlords to 
compensate them for much of the value of 
the improvement, (2) landlords may not be 
able to secure sufficient rent from their 
new tenants to cover the costs of the 
improvement, and (3) an agreement to 
compensate tenants for their improvements 
over 5-10 years tends to convert short-
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term leases into long-term leases. But 
share landlords prefer short terms. This 
is their best guarantee against poor 
farming and unfair division of crops. 
The improvement problem is partially 
solved when the farmer is a part owner. 
Like the full owner, the part owner has 
full freedom to improve the land and 
buildings he owns. This does not apply to 
the land he leases. Nonetheless, part 
ownership helps resolve this problem. In 
1969 part ownership was most common in 
the Great Plains and the West where farms 
have been growing very rapidly. While 
part ownership was less frequent in the 
more productive areas of the Midwest, it 
has been increasing rapidly in recent 
years. Even though few farmers can afford 
to buy all the land they operate, many can 
buy that part of the land on which the 
farmstead is located and thereby 
eliminate that part of the improvement 
problem. Unfortunately, the problem of 
improvement and conservation on the share 
rented land remains. 
D. Will Cost Sharing Improve 
Share Rents? 
Adam Smith had a low opinion of share 
rent leases. He argued that share tenants 
lacked the incentive to farm as intensely 
as cash tenants and owner operators. For 
example, suppose a certain practice costs 
$12 an �ere and can be expected to give a 
return of $18 an acre. Either a cash 
tenant or an owner operator would make $6 
or 50% on his investment. In contrast, a 
share tenant who pays all the cost ($12) 
and gets only two thirds of the returns 
($ 12) will just break even. The landlord 
who pays nothing gets one third or $6. 
Obviously if such share tenants have free­
dom to farm as they please they will not 
make this investment. 
How can share tenants be given the same 
incentive to use this practice as owner 
operators or cash tenants? Some econ­
omists claim that all that is necessary 
is for the landlords to share all variable 
costs in the same way that the produce is 
shared. Thus in the example given above, 
the tenant would pay two thirds of the 
cost ($8) and get two thirds of the 
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returns ($12) or 50% on his investment. 
Likewise, the landlord would pay one third 
($4) and get one third ($6) or 50% on his 
investment. If costs of application are 
shared this solution is valid. 
Because this theory is obviously cor­
rect, why is it that share landlords and 
tenants do not share all variable costs in 
the same way that crops are shared? 
The answer is that such cost sharing 
converts the share-rent lease into a part­
nership. 
The lease, like a deed, conveys or 
transfers possession, use, and enjoyment 
of the land from one party to another. 
Under a lease the tenant has full control 
of the ousiness unless limited by the 
lease. Under a partnership the control is 
shared 50-50 unless otherwise agreed. 
Partnerships have not proven to be a satis­
factory substitute for farm leases. In­
deed, they are a most difficult arrange­
ment that can only work when the partners 
are in general agreement about the details 
of farming or one partner has full faith 
and trust {n the other. 
These requirements are seldom met. 
Sharing all costs as in a partnership may 
make the tenant less secure and hence 
improvements less likely. 
If cost sharing is undesirable, why do 
landlords and tenants generally share 
fertilizer costs? Before commercial 
fertilizers were introduced, crop-share 
rents were well established as one-third, 
two-fifths or one-half share depending 
upon the productivity of the land. If the 
tenant had to pay all of the fertilizer 
cost and give his landlord the usual share 
of the results, this would be unfair. To 
correct this situation either the fertili­
zer costs had to be shared or the general­
ly accepted share rent had to be lowered. 
Sharing the fertilizer costs was the 
practical solution. 
Then why not share all operating or 
variable costs? Both landlords and 
tenants have objected for a number of 
practical reasons. Bookkeeping is one of 
them. For example, if landlords share 
fuel costs, how can they be sure that some 
i' 
of it is not used by their tenants for 
personal purposes? Or consider part 
owners who lease land from one or more 
landlords. How can any landlord be sure 
that shared seeds and fertilizers are used 
on his land? And part owners will be 
tempted to use more of their labor and 
machinery on their own or cash rented land, 
because they receive all the additional 
return rather than only a share. This 
helps explain why part owners pay a cash 
rent for 50% of the land they lease. 
Share landlords have a more effective 
way to get tenants to farm like owners. 
They sometimes tell tenants, "Now don't 
worry about keeping this farm. You can 
keep it as long as you do a good-job of 
farming and pay a fair rent. " Whether 
stated or not, this rule is well under­
stood by most tenants. It's a fair rule-­
an inescapable rule of share renting. It 
means that the tenants must farm like 
owner operators if they hope to keep the 
farm. This may explain why some studies 
show that share-rent tenants seem to farm 
as efficiently as owner operators or cash 
tenants. But tenants must have freedom 
from such control if they are to have full 
freedom to farm, to improve, and conserve. 
Most tenants want these freedoms. They 
know ownership provides them and share 
renting does not. This is one reason why 
so many farmers use their scarce capital 
to buy land. 
IV. FREEDOM AND CASH RENT LEASING 
Can fixed or flexible cash rents pro­
vide farmers with most of the freedom 
provided by ownership? This question is 
important because owner operation has not 
been achieved and maintained on much of 
the nation's best cropland. Furthermore, 
share-rent leasing does not and apparently 
cannot provide this freedom. Fortunately 
the evidence is very strong that cash­
rent tenants may have much of the freedom 
of owner operators. 
A. Much Freedom Provided by 
Cash Rents 
Two hundred years ago Adam Smith ranked 
English farmers as to their freedom to 
improve their farms. At the top he placed 
family sized owner operators. A close 
second were cash tenants -- especially 
when they had long-term leases under which 
he found "the security of the tenant is 
equal to that of the proprietor. " But 
even when cash tenants had only an oral 
agreement, Smith found they had much free­
dom. He declared, "there is, I believe, 
nowhere in Europe, except England, any 
instance of the tenant building upon the 
land of which he has no (written) lease 
and trusting that the honour of his land­
lord would take no advantage of so import­
ant an improvement. " In Smith's view cash 
tenants were about as high above share­
rent tenants as share tenants were above 
croppers or hired men. Pictured as a 
tenure ladder, hired laborers would be 
near the bottom, share tenants in the 
middle, and cash tenants near the top just 
below owner operators. 
Farm tenure specialists have long 
accepted the theory that for maximum 
efficiency farmers must have full freedom 
to operate, develop, and improve. They 
agree that full ownership provides the 
maximum freedom followed by cash-rent 
leasing. When cash tenants have freedom 
from (1) unjustified loss of lease, 
(2) unfair rents, and (3) unfair compensa­
tion for the value of his unexhausted 
improvements, they have much the same 
freedom to operate and improve that is 
enjoyed by owner operators. Most farm 
tenure specialists regard share-rent 
leases.as inferior to cash-rent leases and 
have spent much time and effort in an 
attempt to improve share-rent leases. 
Unfortunately, for reasons already given, 
they have not succeeded. 
Farm tenure workers generally admire the 
English cash leasing system. For centuries 
the English landlords have had much freedom 
from worry about their tenants' farming 
because the way they farmed did not affect 
the amount of the cash rent to be paid. 
This in turn gave their tenants much free­
dom from landlord-tenant friction that 
often leads to loss of lease. As a result, 
even though the leases were often short, 
tenure was often quite long and secure. 
This led landlords to agree to compensate 
their tenants for the unexhausted value 
of their improvements. 
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The evidence is strong that the English 
cash leasing system would provide U. S .  
tenants with more freedom than share-rent 
leasing. Consider, for example, the 
Scully Estates of Illinois, Kansas and 
Nebraska. These Estates use the English 
cash leasing system. They have leased 
200,000 acres of farmland to several hun­
dred tenants for well over 100 years. 
They use a cash one-year lease that must 
be renewed annually. The. laws under which 
they operate are almost the same as those 
of England before 1 887 -- before the 
adoption of present English tenancy 
legislation. 
In 1955 I made a survey of Scully 
leasing in Kansas. Of the 103 farmers 
interviewed , 52 cash rented part or all of 
their land from the Scully Estate and 43 
leased land from other landlords for a 
share rent. Only 8 were full owners. Of 
these 103 farmers, 87% said that the Scully 
tenants had more security of tenure than 
share tenants. The average length of ten­
ure of Scully tenants was 15 years compared 
to 17  years for all U. S. owner operators 
and 6 years for all U. S. tenants. The 
average tenure for English tenants was 
once about 15 years and has increased to 
2 1  years. Some of the Scully tenants had 
leased Scully land for three generations. 
About 60% of these farmers said their 
security was mainly due to the cash rents. 
Almost all of the Scully tenants (96%) 
said they had more freedom to farm than 
share tenants. Two thirds of the other 
farmers agreed. About 80% of the 103 
farmers said this was mainly due to cash 
rents. 
The Scully leases contain a Scotch­
Irish feature not generally found in 
English leases. This feature is tenant 
ownership of the improvements -- particu­
larly buildings and fences. Incoming 
Scully tenants buy these improvements from 
outgoing tenants. When they leave they 
sell them to the new incoming tenants at 
their market value -- subject to approval 
of the new tenants by the managers of the 
Estate. As a result Scully tenants have 
almost as much freedom to erect, remodel, 
or remove improvements as do owner 
operators. 
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Tenant ownership of improvements is 
also found on federal public lands and some 
state lands -- including those of South 
Dakota. This system removes a frequent 
source of landlord-tenant friction and 
probably accounts for some of the tenant ' s  
security of tenure. Certainly it 
provides tenants with much freedom to 
improve. 
The Scully Estates are particularly 
interesting because they show that the 
English cash leasing system can provide 
tenants in this country with much of the 
freedom of owner operators under present 
farm tenure laws. But farmers themselves 
are often opposed to cash leasing in part 
because of the greater risks. Share rents 
provide some 1 1insurance1 1  when crops fail 
or prices are low. 
But what is the cost of this insurance? 
What does it do to freedom to farm? Re­
search and education are needed here . 
U. S. tenants' freedom to farm may be 
weak even if cash rents are used because 
most farm landlords are retired farmers, 
business or professional people, or their 
spouses. Because their ownership is often 
short term, even their cash tenants may 
feel too insecure to develop, improve, or 
conserve the land and buildings. There is 
always danger that the farm may be sold 
and the new owner may want to farm himself 
or perhaps secure a new tenant. Therefore , 
careful consideration should be given to 
laws which would require that any landlord, 
except an active or retired farmer, should 
lease farmland only for cash rents and 
provide permanent or continuous tenure for 
their tenants. To be fully effective, 
sale of the land would have to be subject 
to the tenant's lease. 
These laws might be patterned after 
those of England, where the general 
practice of the better landlords was 
made uniform by law. The first effective 
law was adopted in 1887. Present English 
laws (Agricultural Holdings Act of 1948) 
give tenants freedom from loss of farm as 
follows: (1)  leases shall be continuous 
or permanent but either party may termin­
ate the lease by 1 year's notice which is 
effective for the landlord only if he can 
, .  
, ,  
establish adequate cause for termination, 
(2) upon termination the tenant is enti­
tled to compensation for his improvements 
and the landlord for any deterioration, 
and (3) rents may be arbitrated upon 
request of either party but not more 
frequently than every 3 years. 
"Adequate cause" for lease termination 
may be (a) the land is required for an 
approved nonagricultural purpose, (b) there 
is proof of tenant's poor farming, (c) the 
tenant has failed to pay rent or correct 
a breach of terms, (d) there is a breach 
of terms that cannot be remedied, (e) the 
tenant is bankrupt, or (f) the tenant has 
died. English landlords can sell their 
farms, but the sale is subj ect to the 
tenant's lease. If the tenant wishes to 
continue his lease it can only be termin­
ated for cause in a due process hearing 
before a special land court. The burden 
of proof that the cause is adequate is on 
the landlord. 
In contrast , U , S ,  farm landlords may 
refuse to renew their leases without show­
ing adequate cause for this action. This 
is fully justified when share rents are 
used. Landlords could easily be deprived 
of a fair rent simply because poor farming 
or dishonest sharing under share rents 
would be almost impossible to prove. If 
English-type tenancy laws were adopted in 
this country, landlords would have to 
shift from share rents to fixed or fiex­
ible cash rents. 
V. SOME PROBLEMS FOR STUDY 
Farmers need freedom if they are to 
carry out their responsibilities as 
stewards of the nation's farmlands. As 
has been pointed out, efforts to provide 
this freedom by ownership have not fully 
succeeded. On the most productive lands 
over 60% are leased -- mostly for a 
share rent. 
In such areas, many of the landlords 
lack farm experience. Their numbers will 
grow as the amount of leasing increases. 
Problems with share rents increase as 
farmers become part owners or lease from 
more than one landlord. These changes 
may explain why cash rents have been 
increasing in recent years and can be 
expected to increase in the future. 
Is this trend toward cash leasing in 
the public interest and in the interest 
of farmers and their landlords? If so, 
what research and educational efforts 
are needed? Here are some suggestions 
for future work: 
(1) The comparative advantages and disad­
vantages of cash- and share-rent 
leasing should be made available to 
landlords and tenants. This circular 
summarizes past research on this 
problem for farm leaders and Extension 
workers, but much more needs to be 
done to get the information to 
landlords and tenants. 
(2) Share rents provide the tenant with 
some rent "insurance" because the rent 
varies with crop yields and prices , 
Cash rents may also vary with the 
county average yield and price of the 
principal crop . However, the county 
crop yields are not generally avail­
able from the S. D. Crop and Livestock 
Reporting Service until the following 
spring. Could a County Rent Board, 
composed of landlords and tenants, 
estimate such yields shortly after 
crops are harvested? If so, these 
could be used for flexible cash rents 
that have the main advantages of both 
fixed cash and share rents. 
(3) It is said that share-rent leases are 
desirable because they permit the 
landlord to participate in the manage­
ment of the farm. This may be quite 
helpful when the landlord is a compe­
tent farmer and the tenant is a 
beginner. But could not the beginner 
secure such advice even though he was 
paying a fixed or flexible cash rent? 
(4) Because share-rent landlords provide 
rent "insurance" not provided by fixed 
cash rents, their share rents should 
be higher than cash rents. But how 
much higher? Are crop shares the 
best and cheapest way to secure this 
insurance? Flexible cash rents are 
one alternative. 
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(5) Should U.S. farm tenants be given 
freedom from unjustified loss of 
farms by rules such as those used in 
England? If not, why not? 
(6) Should all farm corporations be requir­
ed to lease the land to the operator 
using either fixed or flexible cash 
rents? If they were, this would give 
the operator more freedom of farming 
and eliminate many management problems. 
Unfortunately such a corporation can­
not qualify under Federal income tax 
laws for taxation like partnerships if 
more than 20% of its gross receipts 
are received as rent. Perhaps this 
could be changed. 
(7) Should farm owners be encouraged to 
put their land in a private or cooper­
ative land leasing bank that would 
then lease the land to an heir until 
he was able to buy it? In Canada, the 
Province of Saskatchewan has created 
a government owned and operated "Land 
Bank" to help keep the farm in the 
family , Since 1972 owners may sell 
their farms to the bank and specify 
which son is to lease it. The cash 
leases are continuous to age 65 and 
may only be broken for "adequate 
cause , "  The tenant may request 
permission to buy the land after leas­
ing for 5 years or more. Or he may 
continue to lease it and specify that 
his wife, or son, or daughter shall 
have the first opportunity to take 
over the lease. There are serious 
problems created by government owner­
ship and leasing of land. Some of the 
problems might be avoided by a cooper­
ative or a private land leasing bank 
which operated under rules similar to 
those of the Canadian Bank. This 
possibility needs to be explored. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the beginning the nation's most 
valuable resource was a wilderness. It 
needed to be wisely developed, improved 
and conserved for future generations. 
Farmers eagerly accepted this responsibil­
ity. They cleared the land of forests, 
brush, and stone, and broke the prairies. 
They built homes , barns, and fences. They 
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established local governments, schools, 
and churches. 
Why were farmers so eager to perform 
this awesome task? Because they had free­
dom to develop, improve and conserve, made 
possible by freedom from loss of land, 
loss of improvements, and unfair land 
charges or rent. They had these freedoms 
because it was public policy that farmers 
should control the land they operated as 
owners, not as tenants -- by deed, not by 
lease ; by buying, not by renting. Their 
self interest ,was the "invisible hand" 
that achieved the public interest. 
While ownership provides freedom to 
develop, improve, and conserve the land it 
has proven to be difficult to attain and 
maintain. Now 40% of the nation's land is 
under lease. In some of the most product­
ive areas of the country over 60% of the 
land is under lease -- mostly for some 
kind of a share rent. 
Share-rent leases do not provide fre�­
dom of ownership. Efforts to improve or 
perfect share-rent leases by sharing all 
variable costs the same way the crops are 
shared only intensifies the element of 
partnership which share rents introduce 
into the lease. Both landlords and 
tenants have rejected this solution. 
Landlords prefer to use the short-term 
lease to make sure the tenant does a good 
job of farming and pays a fair share as 
rent. 
Cash-rent leases can provide most of 
the freedom of ownership. Because cash 
rents give landlords much freedom from 
worry about their tenants' farming, they 
can provide them with much freedom to 
develop, improve, and conserve the land 
and buildings. To do this, landlords must 
give their tenants freedom from (1) unjus­
tified loss of land, (2) unfair rents, 
and (3) unfair compens�tion for the 
unexhausted value of their improvements. 
Some English landlords have provided 
their tenants with these freedoms for 
several centuries. During the past 100 
years the practices of the better estates 
have been made uniform by law. What 
English landlords have done, U.S. land­
lords can also do. This has been demon-
, ,  
strated by the Scully Estates of Illinois , 
Nebraska , and Kansas which have used the 
English cash leasing system with several 
hundred tenants for over 100 years. Their 
tenants have most of the freedom of owner 
operators. 
If farmers are to be stewards of the 
nation's farmlands they must have much of 
the freedoms of ownership to carry out 
their responsibilities. These freedoms 
can be measured by a tenure ladder. When 
farmers own land , they are at the top of 
this ladder ,  Cash rents can be very close 
to ownership or much inferior , depending 
upon the terms of the lease and laws 
affecting it. But in terms of freedom , 
cash rents are usually as far above share 
rents as share rents are above hired men. 
When ownership is not possible , cash 
rents should replace share rents at every 
opportunity. To expand these opportuni­
ties , more research and education is need­
ed on cash-rent leasing. 
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Table 1 .  -- U . S .  farms and how they have been controlled, 1900-1969 
Number Full Part Hired Full 
of farms owners owners managers+ tenants 
Year* millions % % % % 
1900 5 . 7 56 8 1 35  
1910 6. 4 53 9 1 3 7  
1 920 6. 4 52 9 1 38 
1930 6 . 3  4 7  10 1 42 
1935 6 . 8  47  10 1 42 
1940 6 . 1 50 10 1 39 
1945 5 . 9  56 1 1  1 32 
1950 5 . 4  58 15 x 27 
1954 4 . 8  58 18 x 24 
1959 3 . 7  57  22 1 20 
1964 3 . 2  57 25 1 17 
1969 2. 7 62 25 ---+ 13 
Source : U . S .  Census of Agriculture as reported in Agricultural 
Statistics, 1972, p. 504. 
*In 1880 tenancy was 25 . 6% ;  in 1890 it was 28. 4% . Figures for 
full owners, part owners and managers were not collected until 
1900 . 
+In 1964 there were only 17, 798 managed farms . In 1969 this 
class was discontinued and the farms that would have been classed 
as managed farms in past census reports were classed as full 
owners, part owners or tenants depending on how the land was held. 
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Table 2. -- U. S. farmland and how it has been controlled, 1900-1969 
Year* 
1900 
1910 
1920 
1930 
1935 
1940 
1945 
1950 
1954 
1959 
1964 
1969 
Land in 
farms 
Mil . acres 
839 
879 
956 
990 
1055 
1065 
1142 
1161 
1158 
1124 
1110 
1063 
Full 
owners 
% 
52 
53 
48 
38 
37 
36 
36 
36 
34 
31 
29 
35 
Part 
owners 
% 
15 
15 
18 
25 
25 
28 
33 
37 
41 
45 
48 
52 
Hired 
managers+ 
% 
10 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
9 
9 
9 
10 
10 
---+ 
Full 
tenants 
23 
26 
28 
31 
32 
30 
22 
18 
16 
14 
1 3  
1 3  
Source: U. S. Census of Agriculture as reported in Agricultural 
Statistics, 1972, p. 505. 
*No figures available before 1900. 
+See table 1 footnote. 
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Table 3. -- Effect of size of farm on farmer's control, U. S. , 1969 
Class size 
Under 50 acres 
50 to 100 acres 
100 to 180 acres 
180 to 260 acres 
260 to 500 acres 
500 to 1,000 acres 
1,000 to 2, 000 acres 
2,000 acres and over 
Totals, percent 
Number farms, thousands 
percent 
All 
farms 
% 
24  
17 
20 
1 1  
15 
8 
3 
2 
100 
2, 730 
100 
Full 
owners 
% 
30 
2 1  
23 
10 
10 
4 
1 
1 
100 
1, 706 
62 
Part 
owners 
7 
8 
1 4  
13 
26 
17 
8 
6 
100 
672 
25 
Source: U. S. Census of Agriculture 1969, General Report III, 
Chapter 3, Farm Management, Farm Operators, p. 12. 
All farms. 
Full 
tenants 
% 
22  
12 
18 
13 
21 
9 
3 
2 
100 
353 
13 
23 
24 
Appendix 
Table 4. -- South Dakota trends in control of farms and farmland , 
1900-69 
Percent of all operators who are :
I 
Percent o f  land operated by : 
Full Part Hired 
owners owners managers 
1900 49 28 1 
1910 52 22 1 
1920 36 28 1 
1930 27 28 1 
1935 26 25 1 
1940 21 26 + 
1945 25 36 1 
1950 31 38 + 
1954 32 39 + 
1959 32 42 + 
1964 34 44 1 
1969 38 45 
Full Full 
tenants owners 
22 38 
25 74* 
35 26 
44 18 
48 16 
53 1 0  
38 12 
31 17 
29 17 
26 16 
22 19 
17 28 
Part 
owners 
41 
44 
44 
44 
so 
62 
61 
63 
64 
61 
61 
Source : U . S. Census of Agriculture : 1900-59 data 
Pengra S. D. , AES , Econ. Pamphlet 56. 
* Includes part owners 
+ Less than Yi of  1 percent 
- Not reported 
Hired Full 
managers tenants 
3 18 
3 23 
2 28 
2 36 
3 37 
1 39 
3 23 
4 18 
2 18 
3 17 
7 1 3  
1 1  
as repor ted by 
Appendix 
Table 5. -- Farmers' control of commercial farms and land, U. S . ,  South 
Dakota, North Dakota, and Minnesota, 1969 
Number of farms (thousands) 
Number of acres (millions) 
Tenure of farmers (% )  
Full owners 
Part owners 
Full tenants 
Total 
Land by tenure (% )  
Full owners 
Part owners 
Full tenants 
Total 
Size by tenure (acres) 
Full owners 
Part owners 
Full ten.ants 
United 
States 
1734 
918. 3 
50 
34 
16 
100 
29 
57 
14 
100 
299 
909 
467 
South 
Dakota 
40 
39. 6  
34 
49 
17 
100  
21 
68 
1 1  
100 
6 11 
1 , 357 
613 
North 
Dakota 
42 
40. 4 
35 
51 
14 
100 
25 
64 
1 1  
100 
6 9 1  
1 , 226 
745 
Source: U. S. Census of Agriculture, 1969 , (class 1-5 farms) , 
General Report III, Ch . 3, Table 1.9, p .  45. 
Minnesota 
89 
26. 4 
55 
32 
13 
100 
42 
46 
12 
100 
224 
428 
279 
25 
Appendix 
Table 6. -- Full tenants' control of leased land by kind of rent paid, the Dakotas, Minnesota, 
and U.S. , 1969 
United South North 
States Dakota Dakota Minnesota 
All full tenants, number 27 1, 291 6, 952 5, 707 11,523 
Percent of all tenants 100 100 100 100 
Cash 19 13 14 27  
Share-cash 14 32 18 20 
Crop-share 31 28 42 26 
Livestock �hare 10 5 7 7 
Other and unspecified 26 22 19 20 
All land leases ( 1, 000 acres) 126, 605 4, 259 4, 250 3 ,211 
Percent of land leased 100 100 100 100 
Cash 35 2 1  13 24 
Share-cash 15 31  22 25 
Crop-share 23 20 39 2 7  
Livestock share 9 9 10 7 
Other and unspecified 18 19 16 17  
Source: U . S. Census of Agriculture, 1969, General Report III, Ch. 3, p.  18, 43. 
N 
...... 
Appendix 
Tab le 7. -- Par t owners ' control of leased land by kind of rent , for the Dako tas , Minnesota , 
and U.S. , 1969 
United South North 
S tates Dakota Dakota Minnesota 
All part owners ,  number 581 , 271 19 ,910  21 , 239 28 , 607 
Percent leasing , total 100 100 100 100 
Cash 34  26 25 40 
Share-cash 1 3  26 19 1 4  
Crop-share 32 33 4 1  3 1  
Livestock share 3 1 2 1 
Other and unspecified 18 14 13 1 4  
All leased land , ( 1 ,  000 acres) 528 , 436 27 ,016 26 , 042 12 � 24 1  
Percent of  leased land 100 100 100 100 
Cash 50 44 28 39 
Share-cash 13  22  23 18  
Crop-share 19  17 35  30 
Livestock share 2 2 2 1 
Other and unspecified 16 1 5  1 2  1 2  
